Lifetime Employment and a Sequential Choice in a Mixed Duopoly Market with a Joint-Stock Firm

سال انتشار: 1395
نوع سند: مقاله ژورنالی
زبان: انگلیسی
مشاهده: 290

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شناسه ملی سند علمی:

JR_IJMAE-3-5_002

تاریخ نمایه سازی: 7 اسفند 1395

چکیده مقاله:

This paper examines a three-stage game model in which a joint-stock private firm and a state-owned public firm can sequentially offer lifetime employment before competing in quantities. The game runs as follows. First, the joint-stock private firm decides whether to offer lifetime employment. Second, the state-owned public firm decides whether to offer lifetime employment. Third, both firms choose their outputs simultaneously and independently. The paper demonstrates that there is an equilibrium solution where only the joint-stock private firm offers lifetime employment.

نویسندگان

Kazuhiro Ohnishi

Institute for Basic Economic Science, Osaka, Japan