Hedayatollah Shenasaei - PhD Candidate, Faculty of Law, National University of Malaysia
Hossein Taji - PhD Candidate, Faculty of Law, National University of Malaysia

Article IV of the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) expressly recognizes the inalienable right of a Non-Nuclear Weapon State Party (NNWSP) such as Iran, to all forms of peaceful nuclear energy,including uranium enrichment, reprocessing, and nuclear fuel making activities. However, someWestern countries believe that allowing the NNWSPs to develop indigenous nuclear fuel capabilitycould foster nuclear proliferation. Consequently, any country pursuing sensitive nuclear energyactivities is easily suspected of attempting to manufacture nuclear weapons. This paper will show that such suspicion is misplaced. Indeed, many reasons may underlie astate’s decision to acquire an indigenous nuclear fuel capability, such as the desire for nuclear fuelsecurity through reduced dependence on foreign sources, the desire to exploit the commercial potentials of nuclear technology by becoming a net nuclear fuel supplier, and sheer nuclear nationalism. Having said so however, the paper will introduce the multilateral nuclear approach (MNA) offered by theinternational community to the NNWSPs for the establishment of a nuclear fuel bank as a secondoption for the NNWSPS to meet their nuclear energy needs. The MNA is cheaper, safer, and technically easier to implement. It also avoids the political costs (sanctions and isolation) associatedwith the Article IV approach. Furthermore, the MNA can meet the need of the NNWSPs for steady nuclear fuel supplies, whilesimultaneously curbing nuclear proliferation by preventing an apparently peaceful nuclear program under the Article IV approach from being diverted into a military program; a diversion that the IAEA safeguards are not capable of detecting in a timely and accurate manner. Nonetheless, it is suggestedthat in order for the MNA to effectively meet the needs of the NNWSPs, it should be administered byan independent authority, free of political interference, or the imposition of obstructive conditions on the NNWSPs.

Article IV, sensitive nuclear activities, IAEA Safeguards, Multilateral Nuclear Approaches