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Bertrand-nash Equilibrium in the Retail Duopoly Model under Asymmetric Costs

عنوان مقاله: Bertrand-nash Equilibrium in the Retail Duopoly Model under Asymmetric Costs
شناسه ملی مقاله: JR_IJE-30-6_006
منتشر شده در شماره 6 دوره 30 فصل June در سال 1396
مشخصات نویسندگان مقاله:

s Melnikov - Faculty of Economics and Management, Odessa National Maritime University, Odessa, Ukraine

خلاصه مقاله:
In this paper, the Bertrand s price competition in the retail duopoly with asymmetric costs is analyzed. Retailers sell substitute products in the framework of the classical economic order quantity (EOQ) model with linear demand function. The market potential and competitor price are considered to be the bifurcation parameters of retailers. Levels of the barriers to market penetration depending on the bifurcation parameters are analyzed. The conditions of Bertrand-Nash equilibrium in parametric and trigonometric forms are found

کلمات کلیدی:
Economic Order Quantity Model,Retail Duopoly Model,Bertrand-Nash Equilibrium,Market Potential,Bifurcation Parameter,Return on Logistics Costs,Barrier to Entry

صفحه اختصاصی مقاله و دریافت فایل کامل: https://civilica.com/doc/630414/